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Wolin: People v. Selikoff

PEOPLE v. SELIKOFF
CRIMINAL

LAW-plea bargaining-full disclosure of any plea-

inducing promise should be incorporated into the record. 35
N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974).
Plea bargaining,' due in part to its surreptitious nature, is
easily misused by courts, prosecutors, and defendants. The New
York Court of Appeals, in the People v. Selikoffil trilogy of cases,
was confronted with the alleged misuse of the plea bargaining
of these parties. These companion cases raise
process by all three
two questions: 3
[1] [W]hether a defendant may show that his guilty
plea to a lesser crime was induced by an off-the-record unfulfilled promise, although contradicted by the recorded colloquy
on the taking of the plea; and

[2] [W]hether a defendant is entitled to be sentenced as
promised, or, if the court cannot or will not sentence as promised, whether the defendant is entitled to no more than the right
to withdraw his guilty plea.
The practice of plea bargaining has become, of necessity, a
permanent fixture in the American criminal justice system.'
While the concept of plea negotiation has existed in this country
since at least 1804, 5 it is much more prevalent now than ever
before in its long informal history.' Plea bargaining involves a
1. For an excellent discussion on plea bargaining as an institution in our society see

D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHouT TRAL
(1966).
2. 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974).
3. Id. at 232, 318 N.E.2d at 788, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
4. See text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
5. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 232, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 628
(1974).
6. Because of plea bargaining's tradition as a covert process, an exact figure of its
prevalence is difficult to obtain. Generally, it is estimated that 90-95 percent of all criminal convictions are obtained by guilty pleas. NEwMAN, supra note 1, at 3 & n.1. In New
York State, "in 1964, guilty pleas accounted for 95.5% of all criminal convictions in trial
courts of general jurisdiction. . . ." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 n.1 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring), citing PREsIENr's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTS 9 (1967). Undoubtedly, the
majority of these pleas resulted from agreements between prosecutor or court and defendant.
For additional evidence as to the prevalence of plea bargaining, see Brown v. Beto,
377 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1967) (plea bargaining is a "pervasive" practice); Cortez v.
United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965) ("most"
guilty pleas arise from bargains with the prosecutor); People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 608,
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negotiating process between the defense and the prosecution
whereby, as a result of mutual concessions, the defendant usually
agrees to withdraw his previously entered plea of not guilty, and
enters a guilty plea. Pursuant to this agreement, the prosecutor
promises certain considerations. Most common among these are
pledges to recommend lighter sentences, to dismiss potential or
pending matters, to ignore recidivism, and to accept pleas to
lesser included offenses.
If this negotiated compromise is to be effective, all sides must
fulfill their promises. The defendant fulfills his obligation by entering a guilty plea. It is sometimes difficult, however, for a reviewing court to determine the consideration given in exchange
for this plea and, a priori, to determine the prosecutor's or the
court's obligation. The question of consideration bears on the
basic problem of whether a valid agreement existed in the first
place. The three companion cases in People v. Selikoff confront
these problems.
These cases reached the New York Court of Appeals from
judgments affirming the conviction of each defendant. In the process of affirming the convictions, the appellate courts refused to
honor alleged promises which the defendants claimed induced
their guilty pleas.7
In People v. Selikoff,5 the first case before the court, the
defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the second degree
in satisfaction of three multi-count indictments arising out of an
allegedly fraudulent real estate transaction. He also pleaded
guilty to second degree obscenity in satisfaction of a fourth multicount indictment. Upon accepting the reduced plea, the pleading
court judge stated on the record that, on the basis of what he then
knew, it was his opinion that no prison sentence would be imposed.' However, the same judge later presided over the trial of
477 P.2d 409, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 393 (1970) (en banc) (the "vast majority" of criminal
cases are disposed of through plea bargaining); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CiumiNAL Jus'cE: STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuiLTY 60 (Approved Draft, 1968);
Note, The Legitimation of PleaBargaining:Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 Aht. CRiM.

L. REv. 771 (1973); 51 N.C.L. REy. 602, 604 (1973).
7. People v. Selikoff, 41 App. Div.2d 376, 343 N.Y.S.2d 387 (2d Dep't 1973); People

v. Campbell, No. 400/73 (Sup. Ct., Appellate Term, N.Y. County, Nov. 30, 1973); People
v. Davidson, 42 App. Div. 2d 957, 348 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't 1973).
8. 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W.
3404 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1975).
9. Id. at 235, 318 N.E.2d at 789, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
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Selikoff's co-defendants. As a result of additional knowledge obtained at this trial, the judge determined that Selikoff's role in
the fraud had not been peripheral, as he had previously believed.
Because of these new revelations, the judge concluded that he
could not honor his previous conditional promise of no imprisonment."0 The defendant then rejected an opportunity to withdraw
his plea and insisted on performance as promised. The court refused to grant Selikoff's request and sentenced him to an indeterminate five year prison sentence."
In People v. Campbell, 2 the second of the three appeals, the
defendant pleaded guilty to loitering after having been originally
charged with misdemeanor drug offenses. As consideration for the
reduced plea, the Assistant District Attorney, in open court, recommended to the judge a sentence which did not include incarceration. Furthermore, the prosecutor allegedly promised, from
the defendant's perspective, that if a term were to be imposed,
the defendant would be able to withdraw his plea-a promise
which is not within the power of a prosecutor to fulfill. 3 During
the arraignment on the plea no mention was made of this second
promise by either the defendant or the prosecutor. At his arraignment, the defendant was warned that the prosecutor's recommendation was not binding and that sentence might still be imposed
after the court saw the defendant's presentence report. In light of
this fact, Campbell was given a chance to withdraw his plea. He
refused to do so and allowed the plea to stand. 4 At sentencing,
the court, after reviewing the presentence report, advised that a
prison sentence of three months would be imposed. The prosecutor then, for the first time, notified the court of the second agreement. The sentencing court noted that no mention had been
made of such an agreement at5 the arraignment and imposed the
three month prison sentence.
10. Id., 318 N.E.2d at 790, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
11. The prison term was imposed on the grand larceny charge. Defendant was also
fined $1,000 on the obscenity charge. Id.
12. 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974).
13. Id. at 241, 318 N.E.2d at 793, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 636. Withdrawal of guilty pleas in
New York State is strictly within the discretion of the trial judge. See N.Y. Cm,. PRo.
LAw § 220.60, subd. 4 (McKinney 1971), as amended, § 220.60, subd. 3 (McKinney Supp.
1974).
14. People v. Campbell, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 242, 318 N.E.2d 784, 794, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
636 (1974).
15. Id. at 236, 318 N.E.2d at 790, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
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In People v. Davidson," the third case before the court, the
defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the second degree
after having been charged with murder and larceny in separate
indictments. Thereafter, the court told the accused on the record
that a sentence of greater than three to ten years would not be
imposed. In the process, the judge told the defendant that his
promise was contingent on the presentence report. 7 Upon questioning, the defendant denied that any other promises had been
made, whereupon the court accepted the guilty plea. At sentencing, the defendant was indeed given from three to ten years.'
Davidson twice sought post-conviction relief claiming that
the sentencing judge, since deceased, had, contrary to the record,
told defense counsel that the defendant would receive a maximum sentence of four years and that the defendant had relied on
this promise. 9 The defendant at first only supplemented his second application for relief with his own affidavit attesting to the
alleged promise, but on reargument his request was accompanied
as well by an affidavit from defense counsel. 2 Relief was denied
21
without a hearing.
The Court of Appeals decided this trilogy of cases during a
time when plea bargaining was receiving increasing judicial recognition as an integral part of the American criminal procedure
system.22 In the forefront of these decisions are two Supreme
16. 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974).
17. The presentence report is seen as a vital device to insure that a correct sentence

is imposed. Id. at 238, 318 N.E.2d at 791, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 633. See also People v. Aiss, 29
N.Y.2d 403, 405-06, 278 N.E.2d 647, 648, 328 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439-40 (1972); N.Y. CRIm. PRO.
LAW § 390.20, subd. 1 (McKinney 1971).
18. People v. Davidson, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 237, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
632 (1974).

19. Davidson sought relief in the form of coram nobis. Coram nobis proceedings have
as their prime purpose, redress of fraud, trickery, deceit, or coercion in the procurement
of the plea. See People v. Picciotti, 4 N.Y.2d 340, 344, 151 N.E.2d 191, 193, 175 N.Y.S.2d
32, 34 (1958).
20. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 237, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,

632-33 (1974). Cf. People v. Roman, 32 N.Y.2d 709, 710, 296 N.E.2d 803, 344 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1973). In denying coram nobis relief without hearing, after the first application, the
county court noted that defendant had not submitted an affidavit from his attorney at
the time. Id.
21. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 237, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,

633 (1974).
22. See generallyLassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900 (4th Cir. 1970) ("Plea bargaining serves a useful purpose for society, the prisoner and the quality of justice in those cases

which must be tried."); United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir.
1968) ("In recent years there has been a growing awareness of the practical importance of
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Court cases. In Brady v. United States,23 the earlier of the two,
Brady contended that his plea of guilty, entered as part of an
agreement to avoid the death penalty, was involuntary and
should have been set aside. The involuntary nature of the plea,
he claimed, resulted in part from the prosecutor's representation
concerning reduction of sentence and clemency. The Court, in
recognizing the bargain, took notice of the benefits gained by both
sides through a negotiated plea and expressly refused to rule such
a practice unconstitutional.24
The second case in which the Supreme Court dealt with the
merits of the bargaining process was Santobello v. New York.25 In
2
dictum, the Court announced that:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining," is an essential component of the administration of
justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.
In refusing to recognize the alleged promises, the New York
court in Selikoff agreed with the Supreme Court and conceded
the utility of the plea bargaining process. The Court of Appeals
noted many public policy considerations in its holding. For example, the court pointed out that the negotiating process is essential
to the orderly administration of justice. 27 Indeed, citing general
plea discussions and arrangements to the administration of justice."); Brown v. Beto, 377
F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1967) ("[Clonsistent with the fair administration of justice.")
23. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Brady was decided together with two other cases involving
negotiated guilty pleas. These two were Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) and
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). Collectively, the three cases prevented
prisoners who pleaded guilty from subsequently collaterally attacking constitutional defects which might have occurred prior to their plea. In Parker,the accused was allegedly
held in a cell overnight without nourishment. The following morning, he was given water,
whereupon he confessed to burglary and rape. One month later he pleaded guilty in order
to avoid the death penalty. The Court upheld the conviction. 397 U.S. at 799. For further
discussion of McMann, see text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
24. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970), the Court stated:
[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit
to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who
demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime....
25. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
26. Id. at 260.
27. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 233, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
629 (1974). See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 604, 477 P.2d 409, 413-14, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 389-90 (1970) (en banc); PfRaEsiNr's CoithussIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE
CHALLENGE OF CPIE IN A FaE SociETY 135 (1967); 19 STAN.L. REv. 1082, 1085 n.22, 1086-

87, 1090 (1967).
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court congestion, the court seemed to question whether the urban
criminal justice system would survive if courts had the burden of
trying all the cases coming before them.
The court also noted that perhaps the greatest asset to the
criminal justice system of plea bargaining is its ability to
strengthen the ideals of "individual justice.

'28

Implicit in this

concept is the idea that no two defendants are alike. By dealing
with an accused on an individualized basis, the court and the
prosecution can analyze characteristics peculiar to the offender
and properly assess any mitigating factors. This process should
result in the punishment fitting the particular defendant, rather
than having mandatory penalties meted out to a whole class of
defendants accused of similar offenses. Consequently, unduly
harsh penalties may be avoided. The court in its analysis also
recognized a competing policy. This factor is the deterrence, rehabilitation, and social protection that plea bargaining offers."
Once the utility of the plea bargaining process is conceded,
it then becomes crucial to safeguard the procedure from its potential abuses. A guilty plea is a serious matter which should not be
treated lightly in view of the fact that it constitutes a waiver of
several fundamental rights." Among these are rights to a jury
trial, to confront one's accusers, to remain silent, and to present
witnesses in one's defense.3 1 Such waivers are to be viewed with
the "utmost solicitude ' 32 and should not be accepted without a
thorough investigation. In light of these important ramifications,
a court should be extremely reluctant to uphold an unfairly obtained plea. Because the accused is deemed to waive these constitutional rights, due process requires that the plea be entered
knowingly and voluntarily.3 3 It is today accepted case law that:3
28. Id. See People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 605, 477 P.2d 409, 414, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385,
390 (1970) (en banc); PRFSmENrr's ColMMSSlON, supra note 27, at 135; D. NEWMAN, supra

note 1, at 112-30; Note, supra note 6, at 773.
29. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 238, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791-92, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
633-34 (1974).
30. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 265 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
31. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 265 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). Santobello mentions all four of the fundamental
rights referred to in the text, while Boykin mentions all but the right to present witnesses
in one's defense.
32. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
33. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Kercheval v.
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A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive
it of the character of a voluntary act, is void. A conviction based
upon such a plea is open to collateral attack.

The federal courts over the years have enunciated several
principles which courts should apply in determining the voluntariness of the plea. Possibly the leading case dealing with this issue
is the Fifth Circuit case of Shelton v. United States.3 5 Writing a
dissenting opinion which found majority approval on rehearing,"
Judge Tuttle stated:3 7
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including, the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecution, or his counsel, must
stand unless induced by threats . ..misrepresentations (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by
promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper
relationship to the prosecutor's business ....

There are additional standards to test voluntariness. The
Supreme Court, in Kercheval v. United States,31 for example,
held that any plea of guilty shown to have been attained through
"ignorance, fear, or inadvertence" should be vacated. -Unfulfilled promises, misrepresentations, and promises which are statutorily unavailable, such as those allegedly found in the Selikoff
cases, are grounds which can render a plea involuntary and therefore void.
Because few pleas are immune from these conditions which
might possibly render them involuntary or unknowing, courts
should thoroughly examine a bargained plea. Consequently, in
Boykin v. Alabama," the Supreme Court effectively extended to
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th
Cir.) (Tuttle, J., dissenting), rev'd on rehearing,246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc),
rev'd, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam). A knowing or intelligent plea is one which is entered
by a defendant who understands the nature of the charges and the consequences of the
plea; and then makes a reasonable choice based on a rational assessment of his situation.
For illustrations of the voluntariness standard, see text accompanying notes 35-39
infra.
34. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
35. 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing,246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc),
rev'd 356 U.S. 26 (1958)(per curiam).
36. Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc).
37. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
38. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
39. Id. at 224.
40. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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state proceedings a federal rule4 ' directing trial courts to assemble
an affirmative record of the plea's voluntariness.42 In these proceedings, the trial judge must insure, before accepting the plea,
that it is being entered into freely with a "full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequences. '""' By personally
addressing the defendant, the judge can ascertain whether the
plea was induced by unfulfilled promises or misrepresentations.
Such inducements can serve to destroy the voluntariness of
the negotiated plea. When this occurs, the question of possible
remedial action is presented. In Santobello v. New York," the
Supreme Court held that a promise by an Assistant District Attorney to make no sentence recommendation must be honored if
it was a material inducement to the petitioner's guilty plea. The
opinion did not order any specific remedy. The Court only ruled
that, in such a case, the judgment must be vacated and remanded
for further consideration as to whether the circumstances require
either specific performance of the promise or that the petitioner
be able to withdraw his plea." Many jurisdictions, including New
York,46 have cited this aspect of Santobello.
Although judicial recognition of the injustice inherent in plea
bargaining are needed, Santobello opened a Pandora's box.
Courts are now faced with a surfeit of withdrawal and specific
41. FED. R. CRam. P. 11 provides:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept
such plea. . . without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequence of the plea ...
PROPOSED FEDERAL RuLE 11(d) reaffirms this established rule.
42. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). Boykin followed on the heels of
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.459 (1969). McCarthy held that in federal criminal
proceedings, the trial judge must question the defendant personally in order to determine
that the guilty plea is being knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 466-67. Failure to
comply with the requirements of Rule 11 requires reversal and the opportunity to plead
again. Id. at 468-69, 472.
43. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
44. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
45. Id. at 262-63.
46. Because Santobello does not reach constitutional dimensions, it has only been
cited as supportive in state court opinions, not as controlling. See e.g., State v. Richard,
109 Ariz. 85, 505 P.2d 236 (1973); People v. Stevens, 45 Mich. App. 689, 206 N.W.2d 757
(1973); Lambert v. State, 260 S.C. 617, 198 S.E.2d 118 (1973); People v. Weyant, 43 App.
Div.2d 700, 349 N.Y.S.2d 795 (2d Dep't 1973); People v. Dreusike, 42 App. Div.2d 920,
348 N.Y.S.2d 258 (4th Dep't 1973); People v. Craig, 41 App. Div.2d 932, 343 N.YS.2d 365
(2d Dep't 1973).
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performance motions" and must determine what is a promise,
whether an alleged promise actually existed, and if one did,
whether it induced the guilty plea so as to render it involuntary
and void.
The court in Selikoff was faced with these problems and left
no doubt as to its response. In determining whether the guilty
pleas were ultimately voluntary, the court treated the catechisms
on the taking of the plea very seriously. The court records in these
three appeals show conclusively that the trial judges either: (1)
asked if any other promises were made; (2) said that sentence
recommendations were not binding on the court, and/or; (3) gave
the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. Surely
nothing more can be asked of judges in these situations. The
Court of Appeals felt any infirmity as to voluntariness had been
rectified by the courts' examination of the defendants and that
it certainly would not be manifestly unjust to deny Santobellotype remedial action.4 8 The implications of this decision are farreaching. By disposing of these cases on the basis of the defendants' disclaimers of other promises, the court is effectively holding that such denials will insulate a guilty plea against later
challenges to its voluntariness in the nature of unkept bargains.
Mere argumentative assertions, the court implies, lacking any
support in the record cannot form the basis of an appeal.
47. See, e.g., Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Beto,
466 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d
Cir. 1972); People v. Weyant, 43 App. Div.2d 700, 349 N.Y.S.2d 795 (2d Dep't 1973). See
also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 2.1, at 52. The Standard provides:
(a) The court should allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo
contendere whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal,
proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
(ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever
the defendant proves that:
(1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by constitution, statute, or rule;
(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge or that the sentence actually imposed could be
imposed; or
(4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions
contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney
failed to seek or not to oppose these concessions as promised in the
plea agreement.
48. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 242-43, 318 N.E.2d 784, 793-95, 360 N.Y.S.2d
623, 636-38 (1974).
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The holding in this trilogy appears to deviate from accepted
New York judicial practice. The view of the court in People v.
49 was contrary to that
Granello
expressed in Selikoff. The defendant in Granello upon entering his plea of guilty indicated that
no promises had been made to him by anyone concerning sentencing. The Court of Appeals did not deem this denial controlling
and held that the inquiry of the court should not be foreclosed on
the issue of whether plea bargaining had occurred."0 The policy
behind this view was deeply rooted in the traditional nature of the
bargaining process. Plea bargaining was seen as a covert operation in which a defendant would be expected to deny the existence of a bargain out of fear that truthful responses would endanger the agreement. 1 Consequently, denials were viewed as evidential and were not determinative on the issue of voluntariness.
Since denials at the arraignment on the plea were not conclusive, the court in Granello appeared to apply more of a "totality
of the circumstances" approach in determining voluntariness and
the defendant's understanding of the plea. The issue was deemed
one of fact necessitating the consideration of all relevant circumstances indicating the defendant's state of mind. The main vehicle for considering the defendant's claim was an evidentiary hearing. Such a procedure was ordered unless the allegations were
patently frivolous or unless-to use the federal habeas corpus
standard-"the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.""2
The Selikoff court, however, no longer views plea bargaining
as a covert process.53 Despite cases to the contrary, the court
implies that evidentiary inquiries will not be approved unless the
precipitating issue could not have been placed on the record. This
procedure will prevent indiscriminate collateral attacks on the
49. 18 N.Y.2d 823, 222 N.E.2d 393, 275 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1966).
50. Id. at 824, 222 N.E.2d at 394, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 529. Later federal cases have
reached the same result. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Beto, 465 F.2d 829, 830.31 (5th Cir. 1972);
Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1972); Christy v. United States, 437 F.2d
54, 55 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir. 1970).
51. If the judge, the prosecutor, or the defense counsel makes a statement
in open court that is contrary to what he has been led to believe, especially as
to promises by the prosecution or his defense counsel, or as to the effect of a
non vult plea, he would no more challenge that statement in open court than
he would challenge a clergyman's sermon from the pulpit.
A. TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTME 159-60 (1964).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
53. See text accompanying notes 54-64 infra.
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voluntariness of guilty pleas and will further conserve scarce
judicial resources. Obviously, Selikoff severely questions, if not
overrules sub silentio, cases such as Granello where the colloquy
was subject to contradiction and evidentiary hearings were possible.
The court implies that any possible injustice to the defendant resulting from such a practice will be eliminated by insuring
that all parties realize no other purported agreement will be recognized." Full disclosure, through incorporating the basis of the
bargain into the record, will adequately protect the defendant
without having endless evidentiary hearings concerning mythical
promises. Judges, to comply further with this practice, would be
expected to advise the defendant that he may truthfully inform
the court of any agreement without any fear of repercussions. 5
Should inquiry reveal the presence of any deals, counsel can
be expected to state the terms on the record. The method by
which the plea bargain becomes part of the record should be
within the discretion of the trial court. Four possible methods
were suggested in a 1970 California case." These methods are: (1)
the plea bargain can be recited in court and recorded by the court
reporter; (2) the agreement can be incorporated into the minutes
by the clerk; (3) the parties can stipulate in writing; and (4) forms
can be used to record the plea.5 7 Of course, acceptance of the plea
would still be within the discretion of the court. If the agreement
could not be honored, withdrawal of the agreement can be accomplished with little difficulty. On the other hand, under Selikoff,
any negative response by the defendant to the existence of a
bargain is conclusive and prevents further litigation.
The extent to which Selikoff effectively changes the existing
disclosure policy is doubtful because the trilogy can be read
purely as an expression of what the Court of Appeals would like
to see implemented.58 This interpretation makes the court's opin54. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 244, 318 N.E.2d 784, 795, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
639 (1974).
55. Perhaps the judge can incorporate such an advisement into his inquiry to determine whether the plea is being voluntarily and knowingly entered. See Bryan v. United
States, 492 F.2d 775, 781 (5th Cir. 1974); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 413 (3d
Cir. 1973); Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1970).
56. People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970) (en banc).
57. Id. at 611, 477 P.2d at 418, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
58. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 244, 318 N.E.2d 784, 795, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
639 (1974).
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ion no moie than advisory. However, it follows that if denials of
agreements are now dispositive, courts must inform the parties
that all purported promises must be placed on the record. In any
case, debate as to the scope of the Selikoff decision was quieted
in November, 1974 when Judge Richard J. Bartlett, New York
State Administrative Judge, implemented Selikof's recommendation by directing all state judges and justices presiding over
criminal proceedings to comply with the disclosure procedures."
No longer will plea negotiations be a covert operation in New
York.
When fully implemented, these procedures will help prevent
three major abuses heretofore permeating the bargaining process,
all of which are vividly illustrated in the Selikoff appeals. First,
as a result of Selikoff, a judicial check on the fairness of the
process will be assured." The secretiveness of plea bargaining and
the lack of disclosure of alleged promises have prevented trial
judges from adequately insuring the voluntariness of the plea.
The courtroom charade in which the judge ritualistically asks
whether any promises were made and in which a denial is considered pro forma, serves to prevent the trial court from determining
whether a misunderstanding or illusory promise induced the
guilty plea. Only an informed judge can adequately perform this
most important role. Otherwise, any inquiry of the defendant at
his arraignment is nothing but a sham. The catechisms in the
Selikoff cases were of such a nature.
Full disclosure, moreover, reduces the risk of unfair agreements. " By being able to record any promises, the defendant will
be able to show when a promise has not been fulfilled. Had the
59. 173 N.Y.L.J. 17, Jan. 24, 1975, at 4 n.2, col. 6. It must be emphasized that the
effect of this order is apparently only directory. See N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAW § 211-2(e)
(McKinney Supp. 1974) which states that the administrative judge, in lieu of the state
administrator, shall have the power to:
Advise, assist and make recommendations to the appellate divisions of each
judicial department. . . in respect to maintaining and improving the supervision and operations of the courts ...
60. See Comment, JudicialSupervision Over CaliforniaPlea Bargaining:Regulating
The Trade,59 CALF. L. REv. 962,968 (1971); Note, PleaBargaining:The Case ForReform,
6 U. RiCH. L. Rav. 325, 342 (1972).
61. See Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 1970); Heberling, Judicial
Review of the Guilty Plea, 7 LiNcoLN L. REv. 137, 202-03 (1972); Underwood, Let's Put
Plea Discussions-andAgreements-on Record, 1 LoyoLA U. Cmc. L.J. 1, 9 (1970).
In addition to reducing unfair agreements to the defendant, a disclosure policy is
likely to reduce unfair agreements from the public vantage point as well. The prosecutor
will likely think twice before offering an overly extravagant bargain.
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defendants in Campbell and Davidson insured that the alleged
promises, if they in fact existed, were placed on the record, their
post-sentence motions could have been more seriously considered. In Campbell, the defendant claimed he relied on a promise
by the prosecutor which was statutorily unavailable.2 Had this
"promise" been recorded, the defendant would have been quickly
alerted to the fact no promise could have actually existed despite
his subjective state of mind. In all probability, he then could have
withdrawn his plea. A full recordation in these situations will not
only avoid future disputes concerning what was promised but will
also remove from the defendant the heavy burden of showing that
his guilty plea was induced by a secret bargain, especially when
the other party denies its existence.
Finally, by limiting the allegations subject to attack, the
Court of Appeals is reducing the number and difficulty of subsequent reviews.6 3 Cases similar to those at issue will no longer be
challengeable on appeal. 4 At the same time, the court having the
benefit of a complete unimpeachable record can now more effectively consider meritorious appeals.
Even though the procedural safeguards enunciated by the
court will help insulate negotiated pleas from attack, there are
occasions where, in order to prevent manifest injustice, exceptions to the court's pronouncements might have to be made. To
the court's credit, it said, "[a]bsolutes . . have a perverse way
of turning into plagues."6 5 Consequently, the new law and policy
enunciated in Selikoff are not unchallengeable. Except "in all but
the most unusual circumstances," said the court, "no other purported agreement will be recognized."6 6 While intentionally
vague, it is interesting to speculate just what these "unusual
circumstances" might be, since the meaning of the phrase will
62. People v. Campbell, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 241, 318 N.E.2d 784, 793, 360 N.Y.S.2d 626,
636. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
63. See Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 255-56 (9th Cir. 1970); Underwood,
supra note 61, at 5.
64. Indeed, the court, by rejecting the petitioners' claims without even the benefit of
evidentiary hearings, is apparently applying this policy of strict reviewability retroactively
to include the three appeals at issue.
The importance of this application apparently outweighed the countervailing fact
that the defendants were not put on notice concerning the dispositive effect of their denials
at the arraignment on the plea.
65. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 245, 318 N.E.2d 784, 795, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
639 (1974).
66. Id. at 244, 318 N.E.2d at 795, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
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certainly become the source of future litigation.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, so as to amount
to a deprivation of due process during either the negotiations or
the judicial inquiry, is very possibly one "unusual circumstance."
Normally, courts will assume that a defendant, advised by counsel, has reached a rational decision to plead guilty. 7 Courts will
usually presume that the requirements of voluntariness and intelligence have thereby been met. Nevertheless, a multitude of occurrences may draw into question this presumption of a valid
plea. Many of these situations arise from the failure of defense
counsel to safeguard adequately the defendant's rights in the procurement of the plea.
At this point, it will be helpful to explore briefly judicial
standards determining what constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel. As with other criminal proceedings, courts have been
hesitant about initially evaluating the defense attorney's judgment in the plea bargaining context. 8 This limited review was the
result of justifiable fears that too lenient a standard would result
in defendants claiming ineffective assistance whenever counsel
committed a mere tactical error. Terms such as "mockery of justice,"69 "shocking to the conscience of the court,"7 and "so inept
as to reduce the representation to a farce," 7 1 consequently became
typical standards which were applied to evaluate defense counsel's performance.
In 1970, the Supreme Court was finally faced with the issue
in the context of plea bargaining. The Court in McMann v.
Richardson 2 debated the problem of whether counsel's misjudgment as to the admissibility of a coerced confession rendered a
subsequent guilty plea invalid. The Court, rejecting this contention, stated that whether a guilty plea is vulnerable depends:73
67. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970).
68. Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining: What is the
Standard?, 12 DUQUENSE U. L. REv. 321, 325 (1973).
69. Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir. 1967); Bell v. Alabama,
367 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Horton, 334 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1964).
70. Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
882 (1967); United States v. Horton, 334 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1964).
71. Bouchard v. United States, 344 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1965); Reid v. United
States, 334 U.S. 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1964).
72. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
73. Id. at 771. However, the Court also used the terms "gross error" and "serious
dereliction" as the standard of ineffective counsel so as to render a guilty plea void. Id. at
772.
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[A]s an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on
whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
This pronouncement of the Supreme Court that a plea based on
reasonably competent assistance of counsel is voluntary appears
to retreat somewhat from the earlier, stricter standards. Subsequent cases 74 appear to indicate, however, that court review of
similar challenges to bargained pleas is in reality no more lenient
than that before McMann.
Some possible challenges can be observed in the Selikoff trilogy even though no such issues were raised on appeal. When a
guilty plea is predicated upon a bargained agreement, Selikoff
tells us that it is the duty of all sides to insure that the court is
fully informed. A retroactive application of this approach to the
Campbell case, in particular, might very possibly have raised a
credible issue that defense counsel breached his duty towards his
client.
Besides negotiating the plea, defense counsel also should provide his client with a competent assessment of the law and facts
with regard to the consequences of pleading guilty.75 Conceivably,
a misstatement so serious as to influence the entering of the guilty
plea can raise a claim that the defendant's right to effective counsel was violated and that an extra-record inquiry is required.
Again, Campbell is illustrative. Surely, any reasonably competent counsel advising criminal defendants should be aware of
relevant state law in order to recognize a statutorily unavailable
promise.
A similar problem faced the Second Circuit in United States
ex rel. Scott v. Mancusi.71 In that case, the defendant's counsel
allegedly created the impression that the defendant had the right
to unilaterally withdraw his plea. The relevant New York statute, however, stated that plea withdrawal was within the discre74. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S.
250 (1972); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Russell, 444 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1971) ("serious
dereliction"); Burnside v. Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1257, 1261 (D. Neb. 1971) ("a farce and
mockery of justice"); Tiru v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 524, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("gross
error"); Morris v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (N.D. Ga. 1970) ("so completely
inept . . . as to render the proceedings a farce").
75. Gentile, FairBargainsand Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U.L. REV. 514, 535 (1969).
76. 429 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1970).
77. Id. at 108.
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tion of the trial judge."8 The court did not view counsel's misstatement of the law as sufficient reason to render the plea involuntary.79 However, it can still be argued with some force that a
reasonably competent attorney would have known the law.
An insufficient catechism also might be grounds for going
beyond the record. No such question arises on these appeals because the catechisms were obviously adequate and contradicted
the defendants' later assertions. However, due to judicial neglect,
cases might arise in the future where inquiry into the existence
of promises will not be made. While no precise catechism is required to insulate the plea,80 this minimal requirement should
nonetheless be observed.
If no inquiry is made and the record does not contradict the
defendant's later allegation of a promise, it is conceivably unjust
to refuse him the opportunity to prove the existence of such a
promise. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, noted the
contradictory record in the Campbell appeal when it said:"'
[T]he record, upon which the pleading court relied and had a
right to rely, contradicts the concession by the District Attorney
and the contention by defendant, that the plea was induced by
the off-the-record promise. The defendant was expressly asked
whether his plea was induced by a promise other than that the
prosecutor would recommend no imprisonment. He unequivocally responded that there were no other inducements.
This fact was crucial to the court's decision.
It must be emphasized that an allegation of an "unusual
circumstance" will prompt the court to apply more of a "totality
of the circumstances" approach, because the record would no
longer be dispositive. Before an evidentiary hearing should be
ordered to determine whether an off-the-record promise actually
induced the plea, however, the defendant should have to allege
circumstances that will overcome the court's presumption that he
gave an informed and willful plea.
New York is by no means the first jurisdiction to correct plea
bargaining abuses through a Selikoff-type decision. For example,
78. See note 13 supra.
79. United States ex rel. Scott v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
80. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 244, 318 N.E.2d 784, 795, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
639 (1974).
81. Id. at 241-42, 318 N.E.2d at 793, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 636.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss3/11

16

Wolin: People v. Selikoff

Plea Bargaining
the states of Pennsylvania, 2 California,8 West Virginia,8 4 and
Illinois8 5 have previously adopted recommendations that plea
agreements be made part of the record.
Furthermore, the federal courts have not ignored the issue.
The Third,86 Fourth,8 7 and Fifth Circuits 8 have mandated disclosures for federal courts within their jurisdictions. Moreover, Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11,89 following the recommendations of the American Bar Association," extends the
disclosure policy to all federal criminal proceedings by mandating
a specific judicial inquiry and providing a comprehensive scheme
for the regulation of any plea agreement undertaken.
While the new standards enunciated in Selikoff ought to be
effective in themselves, New York has to its credit concomitantly
instituted other reforms that are aimed at terminating the abuses
attendant to bargaining. Placing limitations on the power of the
prosecutor to plea bargain is one example. The New York County
District Attorney's Office, in memoranda dated August 13, 1974,91
and March 18, 1975,12 codified its policy concerning plea bargainSTAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 319(b) (Purdon Supp. 1974).
83. People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970) (en banc).
84. State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, 154 W. Va. 857, 179 S.E.2d 726 (1971). Defendants
were awarded relief after they claimed their guilty pleas were rendered involuntary by the
mistaken belief that a binding agreement had been made. To prevent further similar
occurrences, the court held that any bargain should be made part of the record. Id. at
.
, 179 S.E.2d at 734.
85. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110a, § 402 (Smith-Hurd 1971). Any agreement must be stated
in open court and the judge must confirm the terms of the agreement. Id. at § 402(b).
86. Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 1973).
87. Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1970).
88. Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775, 781 (5th Cir. 1974).
89. PROPOSED FED. R. Cmi. P. 11. Pleas. The section provides:
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure

82. PA.

(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by
the parties . . . the court shall require the disclosure of the agreement in open
court at the time the plea is offered ...
(g) Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the
defendant enters a plea shall be made and

. . .

the record shall include...

any plea agreement ...
90. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 1.5 provides:

By inquiry of the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, the court should
determine whether the tendered plea is the result of prior plea discussions and
a plea agreement, and, if it is, what agreement has been reached.
91. Plea Bargaining Memorandum of Richard H. Kuh, August 13, 1974.
92. Sentencing Memorandum of Robert Morgenthau, March 18, 1975.
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ing. Besides severely restricting the prosecutor's power to recommend sentence, 3 the Office also directed that routine reductions
will not be of more than one class, and that, with some exceptions, single pleas will not be accepted to cover multiple crimes
or indictments. 4 Limiting the prosecutor's role will have the effect of giving the defendant less ground upon which to later attack the voluntariness of his guilty plea.
Plea bargaining must, as this discussion has indicated, be
subject to closer judicial scrutiny. It follows that the trial judge
must know the terms of any agreement and any possible impediments such as coercion and ineffective counsel. Having the plea
bargain fully recorded serves much of this function. However,
increased judicial participation can also serve to inform the trial
court.
Judges usually do not directly participate in plea discussions, for their participation is subject to much criticism." Among
the reasons which have convinced courts to declare judicially
induced bargains unconstitutional are that: (1) the defendant
might not want to risk rejecting the judge's offer; (2) judicial
participation might make it difficult for the judge to determine
objectively the voluntary nature of the plea; (3) judicial promises
are inconsistent with the idea of presentence reports; and (4)
judicial participation may serve to prejudice the defendant into
thinking he could not have a fair trial were he to go to trial before
the same judge.96 The American Bar Association Standards"
93. Id. The memorandum, stating that recommendations will be more effective if
used sparingly, limited their use in routine cases to two circumstances. The first exception
would occur if at sentencing the judge asks the assistant prosecutor for a recommendation.
The other permissible circumstance would occur if the assistant believes that special
circumstances justify an unsolicited recommendation. The written authorization of the
bureau chief is required. Id. at 3-4.
While calling for a more active role for prosecutors in sentencing, this memorandum
apparently reflected little change from the view of Morgenthau's predecessor, Richard H.
Kuh. In a memorandum dated March 12, 1974, Kuh stated that while plea negotiations
are the business of the prosecutor, sentencing is the court's responsibility and the prosecutor should not use plea bargaining to enforce his own concept of what is proper.
94. Memorandum, supra note 91, at 4-7.
95. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Commonwealth V. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689, 690-91 (1969).
96. ABA STANDmDS, supra note 6, at 73 (commentary).
97. Id. at § 3.3(b). The trial judge may permit disclosure to him of any tentative
agreement before the plea is entered. He will then inform the parties whether he will
accept the agreement if the presentence report permits.
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would limit judicial involvement to ratification of a conditional
agreement reached by the opposing sides.
Other courts, though, have ruled that:98
Simply because the promise made by the judge induced the
defendant to plead guilty does not make that plea involuntary,
rather, the promise must be of the prohibited type to affect the
voluntariness of the defendant's plea. . . . The issue ultimately
to be resolved is not so much who participated in the plea discussions but whether the defendant's decision to plead guilty
was coerced or otherwise invalid.
This is the better approach because further judicial scrutiny, properly controlled, will help insure fairness in obtaining the plea.
Asking for increased judicial participation does not mean that
judges should become active advocates. This method can result
in conduct so coercive as to render a subsequent plea involuntary. 9 A practice whereby a judge confers with both prosecutor
and defense counsel to explore the suitability of the plea bargain
they have independently reached is within the bounds of decency.
The judge might also act as a neutral arbiter, hearing both sides
recommend possible dispositions. Under no circumstances can
such a system be considered coercive, especially if a different
judge presides at a possible later trial.
Similar practices have already been instituted in many New
York lower courts.' In these courts, the negotiation process is
centered in a special court entitled the "Conference and Discussion Court," whose sole purpose is to review both sides of felony
cases and to recommend possible dispositions. 0 1 Judicial involvement in conjunction with the recordation policy which the Court
of Appeals enunciated in Selikoff, will have the dual effect of
enhancing judicial control while allowing the defendant access to
98. Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (4th Cir. 1970). Accord, United States

ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 892 (1968).
99. See United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). Judge Weinfeld, in reversing, cited the awesome power of the judge and the unequal
bargaining position between the parties. In light of these factors, he went on to state:
A guilty plea predicated upon a judge's promise of a definite sentence by its very
nature does not qualify as a free and voluntary act.

Id.
100. McIntyre & Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony Cases, 56
A.B.A.J. 1154, 1157 (1970). A similar procedure has been instituted in Chicago courts. Id.
101. Id.
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greater information thereby permitting a more informed and voluntary guilty plea.
This casenote has examined the problems created by allegedly unkept plea bargains and misunderstood negotiations as
they applied to the Selikoff trilogy. As long as plea bargaining
remains a covert process, there cannot be effective judicial scrutiny and appellate review. Courts will be unable to decide
whether or not an alleged promise unfairly induced a plea. People
v. Selikoff recognizes the source of these abuses and the need to
take preventive steps. The court's action, together with the other
remedial measures noted, will remove plea bargaining from its
shroud of secrecy and transform it into a more effective practice
in the future.
Alan E. Wolin
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